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The Affective Turn: Theorizing 
the Social, ed. Patricia Ticineto 
Clough with Jean Halley. 
Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2007. Pp. xiii + 313. $84.95 
cloth, $23.95 paper.
The Affect Effect: Dynamics of 
Emotion in Political Thinking and 
Behavior, ed. W. Russell Neuman, 
George E. Marcus, Ann N. Crigler, 
and Michael MacKuen. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
Pp. 453. $60.00 cloth, $24.00 paper.
Certainly one of the primary impacts 
of the renewed interest in affect 
within the humanities and social sci-
ences has been the problematizing 
of our traditional notions of social 
construction or cultural causality. 
The contention that the bulk of our 
feelings appear tied to fairly robust 
and physiologically instantiated “af-
fect programs” has led humanities 
theorists to challenge previously 
dominant theories of social and ide-
ological construction and to adopt 
a more empathetic stance toward 
research of the “hard sciences.” At 
the same time, the works of canoni-
cal philosophers who have more tra-
ditional homes in the humanities, 
such as Descartes, Aristotle, and 
Spinoza—thinkers who wrote be-
fore the drawing of disciplinary lines 
and who created theories that Affect 
Effect contributor Michael A. Neblo 
calls “psychologies with political 
intent” (27)—have enjoyed a renais-
sance within the social sciences and 
become for many a crucial adjunct 
to unpacking empirical research on 
autonomic responses. Much research 
in both of these exchanges has re-
volved around the complex parsing 
of cultural and subjective “triggers” 
for affective experience in relation to 
the material functions and response 
mechanisms of the endocrine and 
nervous systems.
The root causes for the turn to 
affect, however, may be much easier 
to map. One might, for instance, 
chart the rise of interest in affect as a 
response to the popularity of “post-
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human” theory over the past decade. 
While many of the capacities previ-
ously taken as the unique domain 
of humans have been replicated in 
mechanical realms, affect has often 
been positioned, as in the work of 
N. Katherine Hayles, as a property 
that remains singular to humanity. 
Similarly, one could index the turn 
to affect in relation to changes in the 
technological resources and stylistics 
of aesthetic media, such as cinema. 
In this genealogy, a line could be 
drawn tracing movements from 
the early “cinema of attractions” 
(e.g., Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat, 
1896), to the birth of narrative fi lm 
proper (The Great Train Robbery, 
1903), to the era of pastiche and 
narrative recycling (to keep with the 
train theme: Throw Momma from 
the Train, 1987), and, fi nally, to the 
popularity of fi lms that stage a re-
turn of sorts to the cinema of attrac-
tions by targeting viewers’ affective 
responses explicitly through the use 
of nonlinear sequencing and other 
devices (Trainspotting, 1996, and 
subsequent fi lms such as Run Lola 
Run, 1998, and Requiem for a 
Dream, 2000, analyzed by Jamie 
“Skye” Bianco in her contribution to 
Affective Turn). However, the shift 
that intersects these others and in-
forms some of the strongest work in 
both of the anthologies under review 
here is perhaps best described in 
reference to political economy—
that is, if one takes the term “politi-
cal economy” in its broadest sense to 
describe both how value is created 
within culture and the complicated 
mediations between individual and 
group identities within such a pro-
cess. This genealogy might begin 
with Adam Smith’s paradigmatic 
gesture of “the invisible hand” of 
the market (one that survives in 
modifi ed form today in free market 
enthusiasm of the Hayekian variety). 
It is this invention of Smith’s that 
fascinated the young G.W.F. Hegel 
and inspired the latter’s conception 
of “the ruse of reason” to foreground 
the complex interactions between 
the conscious and unconscious mo-
tivations of the individual as well 
as between the motivations of an 
individual and the collective. This 
latter structure, and in particular its 
further transposition by Marx, is the 
one most clearly being worked 
through and against in the pages 
of Affective Turn and Affect Effect, 
while their contributors assay the 
intensities of immaterial labor and 
the infl uence of human physiology 
on political belief and decision mak-
ing in an era of post-ideological crit-
ical theory.
As the title suggests, Affective 
Turn positions recent work on affect 
in the humanities and social sciences 
as a pivotal shift comparable to ear-
lier “turns” (“linguistic,” “ethical,” 
etc.) in these disciplines, and there 
is much that is convincing and pro-
vocative about the work collected 
here to justify this comparison. All 
of the essays were originally com-
posed while their authors were com-
pleting doctoral work in such areas 
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as sociology, women’s studies, and 
cultural studies, and participating in 
projects administered by the Center 
for the Study of Women and Society 
at the Graduate Center of the City 
University of New York. As such, 
they tend to share a focus on a fairly 
narrow and consistent set of sources 
for their theoretical foundations, 
most notably the works of Gilles 
Deleuze, philosophers that were 
important to Deleuze’s conception 
of affect (primarily Baruch Spinoza 
and Henri Bergson), and thinkers 
who at least in some way made their 
bones as interpreters of Deleuze or 
these other philosophers (Brian 
Massumi, Manuel DeLanda, Keith 
Ansell Pearson). These relatively 
uniform infl uences are balanced, 
however, by a dedication to taking 
the capaciousness of the Spinozistic 
defi nition of affect as both capacities 
to affect and be affected quite seri-
ously. As editor Patricia Ticineto 
Clough writes in her excellent and 
thorough introduction, in this col-
lection “affect is not only theorized 
in terms of the human body” but is 
also “theorized in relation to the 
technologies that are allowing us 
both to ‘see’ affect and to produce 
affective bodily capacities beyond 
the body’s organic-physiological 
constraints” (2). Similarly, contribu-
tors spill a large amount of critical 
ink foregrounding what Clough re-
fers to as “the intensifi cation of self-
refl exivity” in information technol-
ogies, human bodies, media systems, 
and hypercapitalism that make it 
diffi cult to diagram the boundaries 
between the personal and collective 
operations of affect (terrain also cov-
ered in somewhat more restricted 
terms in Clough’s 2000 book, Au-
toaffection: Unconscious Thought 
in the Age of Technology). Overall, 
the contributors’ willingness to ex-
tend their theorizing of affect 
beyond human subjectivity, and at 
times into inorganic realms, is salu-
tary during a time when discussion 
of affect is often dominated by a 
focus on subjective experience.
This admixture of the human 
and nonhuman is at the heart of 
the fi rst two of four subject clusters 
that organize Affective Turn, coded 
by Clough as mapping conceptual 
shifts “From Traumatized Subjects 
to Machinic Assemblage” and “From 
the Body as Organism to Non-
Organic Life.” Both categories an-
chor contributions that attempt to 
think of subjectivity as “beyond” or 
otherwise in opposition to the limits 
of psychoanalysis and performativ-
ity theory. The most stylistically 
experimental chapters in Affective 
Turn are gathered under these clus-
ters, including autoethnographic 
and performative accounts of such 
topics as child abuse, geographical 
displacement, and suicide. These 
pieces juxtapose and integrate vari-
ous registers of response to their sub-
jects, such as the switching between 
personal experience, poetry, and her 
relatives’ histories in Hosu Kim’s 
“The Parched Tongue,” which dia-
grams the traumas of migration 
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across several generations. Deborah 
Gambs’s “Myocellular Transduction: 
How My Cells Trained My Body-
Mind” likewise combines poetic 
components, autoethnographic de-
scriptions of the author’s physical 
training, media accounts of mara-
thon training, and glosses of Mas-
sumi’s work in describing mind-
body refl exivity on both a societal 
and personal level. The authors of 
these chapters defer from offering 
explicit conclusions or arguments; 
rather, their thick descriptions of 
affective experience attempt to per-
form the affective responses and 
experiences under review as much 
as they work to articulate them 
within a critical framework. A sim-
ilar methodology was also recently 
explored in Kathleen Stewart’s 
autoethnographic Ordinary Affects 
(2007), and as in that book, these 
segments in Affective Turn provide 
an addition and counterbalance to 
the more traditionally analytical and 
argumentative material within those 
same chapters and the others within 
the collection.
Entries in the other two subject 
clusters organizing Affective Turn 
take a more systemic approach to 
their treatments of affect and the 
uses of affect theory, organizing 
their interventions in relation to 
two intersecting models for map-
ping affect within social and eco-
nomic systems: Deleuze’s late-life 
writings on Foucault and power, 
and autonomist–infl uenced work 
on affective labor (most notably the 
essay of the same name by Michael 
Hardt, who also penned the preface 
to Affective Turn, and his frequent 
collaborator Antonio Negri’s “Value 
and Affect”). The former cluster, 
described by Clough as responding 
to the movement “From Discipline 
and Representation to Control and 
Information,” engages the transi-
tion from a Foucaultian model of 
disciplinary power focused on con-
fi ned sites of training and the 
creation of relatively “stable” role-
based identities, to its retrofi tting 
in Deleuze’s work on “control soci-
eties,” in which value can be increas-
ingly extracted from any kind of 
subjectivity or bodily capacities 
whatsoever.
Though the responses to this 
pairing are admirably diverse 
(including Jamie “Skye” Bianco’s 
provocative tracking of control 
mechanisms in the “non-human 
temporalities” of contemporary cin-
ema and Karen Wendy Gilbert’s 
dizzying attempt to extend bio-
philosophical conceptions of the 
body in relation to symbiogenesis, 
cell phase-state, and bioenergetics), 
the chapter that perhaps most 
productively pursues this line is 
Greg Goldberg and Craig Willse’s 
“Losses and Returns: The Soldier in 
Trauma.” Goldberg and Willse take 
up one of Foucault’s primary exam-
ples of the subject of disciplinary 
power—the soldier—to index the 
coexistence of disciplinary and con-
trol models of power used in extract-
ing value from U.S. soldiers serving 
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in Iraq. As Goldberg and Willse 
document, the capacities of the sol-
ider-body are still certainly worked 
the same “disciplinary” way they 
have been for centuries—U.S. sol-
diers continue to receive extensive 
training and drilling in bodily com-
portment, as well as psychological 
“preparation” for the violence and 
trauma they may infl ict and experi-
ence. However, they also have ears 
for how these techniques are over-
lapped by strategies and practices 
more in line with the “lighter and 
faster” forces of “control” (a coexis-
tence also marked, the authors’ note, 
in Foucault’s own late-life writings 
on biopower). On the one hand, 
training is no longer confi ned to 
physical sites, or even to individuals 
already inside the military, as exem-
plifi ed by Goldberg and Willse’s 
description of America’s Army, the 
video game/recruiting tool for that 
branch of the armed forces (or, as 
stated on the offi cial website, a 
system that “provides young Amer-
icans with a virtual web-based envi-
ronment in which they can explore 
Army career opportunities within 
an entertaining setting that is tai-
lored to their interests and apti-
tudes”). On the other hand, the 
growing number of traumatized 
and injured bodies created by the 
war has also produced its own re-
gime of biopolitical negotiations 
(such as the calculus that returning 
soldiers must consider when request-
ing antidepressants to cope with the 
trauma they have experienced, or in 
navigating the bureaucracy of dis-
ability benefi ts) as well as much 
value for growing biopolitical econ-
omies of therapy (both physical and 
mental) and medical research. As 
the authors argue in alluding to the 
double meaning of their essay’s title, 
such phenomena force us to rethink 
our traditional conception of criti-
cally wounded soldiers “as the loss of 
a fi ghting force” as one in which “the 
trauma of the Iraq war . . . offers 
unexpected returns: opportunities 
such as the fi nancialization of health, 
illness, and injury . . . as well as the 
development of new rehabilitative 
technologies, all of which offer 
the possibility to modify and extend 
governmental management and the 
administration of mutations of life” 
(281). Although the bureaucratic 
torment of returning soldiers and 
the uses of wounded soldier-bodies 
for scientifi c research have been 
very much in the news, Goldberg 
and Willse’s contribution is notable 
for its deft analysis of both the co-
existence of “disciplinary” and “con-
trol processes” within contempo-
rary bio power and, more generally, 
the value of Foucaultian theories 
of biopower in thinking through 
affect and affective economies. Dur-
ing a time in which the party line on 
Foucault’s biopower writings con-
fi gures it as either a contradiction 
or correction to his earlier work on 
discipline, and the most notable use 
of Foucault’s late work in relation to 
affect theory has been Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s positioning of the popu-
 ON NEW BOOKS ON AFFECT 165
larity of (at least some interpreta-
tions of) his “repressive hypothesis” 
as one of the primary reasons one 
must turn away from such work and 
toward affect theory, such an inter-
vention is both timely and welcome.1 
Similar concerns over changes 
in training and the organization 
of work form the core of chapters 
organized as responses to theories of 
affective labor, which take up fash-
ion models (Elizabeth Wissinger), 
health-care workers (Ariel Ducey), 
unpaid domestic laborers (David 
Staples), and sex workers (Melissa 
Ditmore) as subjects. Wissinger 
presents fashion models as “key 
players in the expansion of an affec-
tive economy, including its global 
economy” through personal inter-
views with those in the industry 
and a carefully crafted genealogy of 
how the growth of model “celebrity” 
proceeded in conjunction with me-
dia and information technologies 
(233). For Wissinger, the modeling 
industry is a key site for diagnosing 
affective economies and modeling 
one of the best examples of “the 
effort to amplify and modulate 
the fl ow of affect by embodying 
an image or stimulating an energy 
not immediately assimilable to con-
sciousness” (243). Ducey similarly 
makes deft use of personal interviews 
in her treatment of health-care work-
ers who not only perform clear ex-
amples of affective labor but also are 
at the center of an affective economy 
of education and training organized 
around the desire for attributing 
“meaningfulness” to that occupation. 
As Ducey writes, opportunities for 
education and training for health-
care workers offer a largely para-
doxical resource for those pursuing 
a vocation that is “more than just a 
job”: “The training and education 
industry can offer itself as a vehicle 
for achieving meaning while the 
industry’s existence—in fact, its re-
generation and growth—depends 
on the fact that meaning perpetually 
vanishes” (195). As Ducey goes on to 
argue, the cultivation of this desire 
often obscures concern over the in-
equitable wage of health-care work-
ers, while at the same time the “prof-
its” of this desire accumulate around 
the health-care “industry” rather 
than its practitioners.
These chapters on affective labor 
also most explicitly foreground the 
diffi culty of integrating affect into 
theories of political economy and 
possibilities for political action. Al-
though contributors ably map how 
affect creates value in contemporary 
capitalism, they struggle somewhat 
with determining the value of af-
fect—or, more precisely, the value of 
affect theory—in changing our 
responses to economic and cultural 
practices. Granted, many of the 
authors explicitly position their 
projects as diagnostic rather than 
prescriptive in nature. Wissinger con-
cludes by suggesting that thinking 
about “preindividual forces of affec-
tivity and bodily energies” provides 
a “new angle” on how imagining 
technologies constitute bodies (255). 
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Ducey similarly defers focus on pos-
sible responses to affective labor, ar-
guing that since affect “is not subject 
to the usual forms of measurement 
and analysis . . . the political responses 
its modulations call forth are emer-
gent and unpredictable” (205). The 
essays that do focus most explicitly 
on such responses are, ironically, 
those in which theories of affective 
labor are a starting-off point rather 
than a consistent resource in their 
analysis. As such, their conclusions 
tend to follow descriptions of the 
new importance of affect in eco-
nomics and culture with fairly tradi-
tional suggestions for intervention 
based on collective organization and 
political recognition. For example, 
Melissa Ditmore concludes her 
sharp analysis of the Dunbar Mahila 
Samanwanya Committee, an orga-
nization that promotes the safety 
and welfare of its sixty thousand 
Indian sex workers, by noting irony 
“in the fact that the DMSC works 
with immaterial affect laborers in 
the world’s oldest, but as yet unrec-
ognized, profession to advance their 
cause at a far deeper, more meaning-
ful and effective level than has been 
achieved by recognized workers in 
affect labor” (184). However, the 
productive interventions identifi ed 
here are fairly traditional, and be-
cause of the relative singularity of 
what Ditmore calls “the world’s 
oldest form of affective labor” (both 
generally and particularly in India, 
where the laws governing sex work 
are fairly ambiguous), it is diffi cult 
to imagine how the examples given 
here might be translated to other 
forms of affective labor (such as 
health care, “women’s work,” and 
modeling, to use the other industries 
assayed in this subject cluster) (170). 
Similarly, David Staples contributes 
a notable argument that affective 
labor is best approached through a 
Bataillean general economy rather 
than a restricted political economy, 
but his conclusion suggests that the 
best response to the devaluation of 
“women’s work” is to quantify the 
time of that labor; drawing on 
Derrida’s work on gift economies, 
Staples states that although the “eth-
ical duty or responsibility implicit in 
child care cannot be measured, or 
estimated, or valorized as such,” the 
“time of child care can,” and can also 
be rewarded based on its duration, 
a measure he sees occurring in the 
commodifi cation of child care gen-
erally and in the 1999 rewriting 
of the constitution of Venezuela in 
particular (145). Both the conclu-
sions marking the unpredictability 
of future response and those relying 
on fairly traditional strategies of 
intervention speak to the relative 
diffi culty of following up analyses 
of the operations of affect with 
techniques for mobilizing affect 
productively.
All of which is to say, though 
Affective Turn does a better job of 
introducing readers to the central is-
sues surrounding the study of affect 
in the humanities and social sciences 
than any single work I am aware of, 
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its value comes as much from the 
way it underscores sticking points 
or aporias in this work as from the 
individual accomplishments of its 
contributors. Indeed, the above con-
cerns are perhaps better taken not as 
criticisms of Affective Turn but of 
the segment of “the affective turn” 
to which the authors are most com-
monly responding—work, notably 
that of Sedgwick and Massumi, that 
has positioned affect theory as a 
productive alternative to “critique” 
in its traditional sense: a “way out” 
of the ostensibly moribund focus 
on relationships of dominance and 
subversion and the identifi cation 
of this or that phenomenon as 
ideologically or socially constructed. 
Certainly such an endeavor has had 
a salutary effect on the contempo-
rary critical terrain, both through its 
emphasis on the often-neglected 
role of human physiology and ner-
vous processes in human subjectivity 
and ideation, as well as its antago-
nism toward the idea that beliefs 
and predispositions can somehow 
be made privative or defused when 
exposed to rational critique. How-
ever, the question of how to deploy 
these insights within the tradition-
ally “rational” ecology of research in 
the humanities and social scientists 
has proven to be a thornier issue.
One could, for instance, abandon 
traditional registers of academic crit-
icism, as do the more experimental 
and autoethnographical chapters 
in Affective Turn. These works re-
main somewhat unsatisfying, how-
ever, because even though they may 
succeed in producing a “feeling” of 
or for the affective phenomena un-
der review, the motivational or per-
suasive import to the work is much 
less clear. One could also simply 
emphasize the importance of affect 
as a critique of “critique” itself, as do 
Goldberg and Willse, who in their 
piece marvel that even after the 
impact of deconstruction, “academic 
scholarship continues to engage 
media objects as exterior, applying 
theory against them to interpret or 
reveal their meanings and truths” 
(265). Similarly, Bianco positions her 
work as an intervention into the 
dominance of psychoanalytical and 
ideological approaches to fi lm criti-
cism. Yet, I take it, though such 
paradigms have not necessarily en-
tered “straw man” territory at this 
time, we are seeing diminishing re-
turns on such calls as they continue 
to multiply. Perhaps most telling 
is the emphasis, behind these ap-
proaches and throughout much 
of the work within the volume, on 
affect as not only primary in many 
dimensions of experience but also, 
unlike experience itself, ultimately 
irreducible and “unrepresentable.”
Such an emphasis makes the crit-
ical edge of the majority of chapters 
more what we might code “aesthetic” 
than rhetorical, or more focused on 
the description of affects and affec-
tive processes rather than their pos-
sible manipulation. The infl uence for 
this approach, it seems, is at least 
partially Massumi’s “The Autonomy 
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of Affect,” which looms large over 
much of Affective Turn. The terms 
and phrases used there to describe 
affect and affective “intensity”—
“unassimilable,” “outside expecta-
tion and adaptation” (85), “in excess 
of any narrative or function line” 
(87), “irreducible excess” (87)—are 
recurrently paraphrased and allud-
ed to throughout the volume.2 In 
Affective Turn, as in Massumi’s 
article, such depictions, as much as 
they are meant to be in some way 
“post-postmodern,” seem to at least 
equally take us back to a certain type 
of pseudo-modernist aestheticism. 
Indeed, the references cited above 
ring most clearly as descriptions of 
“the sublime” more than anything 
else. Perhaps, as Negri contends in 
another oft-cited work that also 
emphasizes the “immeasurability” 
of affect, “the Sublime has become 
normal.”3 However, it seems we have 
yet to fi nd the way to move from 
describing affective processes in 
aesthetic terms to producing strate-
gies for mobilizing those processes, 
or, perhaps more precisely, how we 
might use our recognition of the af-
fective dimension of politics to lever-
age affect for political purposes.
For this reason it was immensely 
valuable to read Affective Turn in 
conjunction with Affect Effect: Dy-
namics of Emotion in Political 
Thinking and Behavior, which takes 
a rather different approach to affect 
theory in both method and perspec-
tive. The focus for the majority 
of the contributions is on discrete 
processes of affective response, many 
of which are empirically or clinically 
assayed by the authors and related to 
current research in psychology and 
neuroscience. The majority of the 
authors are also much more modest 
in their claims for the difference 
made by using affect theories of 
motivation and decision making 
as opposed to other models. For 
instance, Peter R. Nardulli and 
James H. Kulinski, though noting 
the “enrichment” provided through 
attention to emotion in their analysis 
of the infl uence of anxiety on politi-
cal desires, candidly conclude that 
omitting this focus would have pro-
duced no substantial change in their 
predictions (a conclusion they take 
to foreground a need to be wary of 
translating micro-level operations 
of affect to higher-level political 
patterns). Contributors to Affect Ef-
fect additionally draw on a much 
more diverse set of sources for their 
affective theories, many of which 
are listed in the four-page chart in-
cluded in the editors’ introduction 
and covering ground from William 
James’s work on affective tagging to 
contemporary psychiatry.
However, the most sustained en-
gagement throughout Affect Effect 
is the variety of responses to the 
theory of “affective intelligence” de-
veloped by coeditor George E. Mar-
cus in 1988 and expanded more re-
cently by Marcus in The Sentimental 
Citizen: Emotion in Democratic 
Politics (2002),4 and by Marcus and 
coeditors W. Russell Neuman and 
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Michael MacKuen in their book 
Affective Intelligence and Political 
Judgment (2000).5 Drawing on re-
search into the brain’s limbic region, 
affective intelligence theory posits 
two primary systems driving political 
thinking. The “dispositional” system, 
maintained by familiarity and the 
positive affects of enthusiasm, moti-
vates individuals to continue relying 
on their existing conceptions and 
perspectives. The “surveillance” sys-
tem, triggered by unfamiliar and 
uncertain contexts and the concom-
itant negative affect of anxiety, 
motivates people to break with ha-
bituated responses, seek additional 
information, and engage in more 
deliberative decision making. As 
Marcus, Neuman, MacKuen, and 
Luke Keele write in their contribu-
tion to the collection, affective intel-
ligence theory departs from the 
conventional thinking of theories 
of rational choice or bounded ratio-
nality by suggesting that while ratio-
nality is “critical to the managing 
of uncertain conditions,” it is “not 
well suited to the familiar realm of 
habit,” given its relative ineffi ciency 
in relation to the scarcity of available 
human cognitive resources (127). As 
an intervention into research on po-
litical thinking, affective intelligence 
theory is perhaps most notable for 
foregrounding how affect can be 
leveraged to explore the context or 
conditionality, what the above au-
thors call the “important ‘if then’ 
component,” that drives a person’s 
responses to political stimuli.
This emphasis on context and the 
feedback that takes place between 
the body and thought as well as 
between disposition and novelty is 
refl ected in the defi nition of affect 
and emotion (terms used inter-
changeably in the volume) applied 
in Affect Effect. As the editors write, 
contributors identify affect as an 
“evolved cognitive and physiologi-
cal response,” or, drawing on the 
work of psychologist Klaus Scher-
er’s work, the simultaneous recruit-
ment of mental and somatic re-
sources that occurs in reaction to 
events that appear to have signifi -
cance to the individual experiencing 
them (9). Affective intelligence the-
ory is also central to the sections on 
“micro” and “macro” models of po-
litical behavior that form the bulk of 
the collection, and chapters in these 
areas are largely dedicated to testing, 
refi ning, and extending the theory’s 
contentions. In the section on micro 
models, David P. Redlawsk, An-
drew J. W. Civettini, and Richard R. 
Lau argue that more attention needs 
to be paid to the precise thresholds 
guiding what impact affects such as 
enthusiasm and anxiety will have on 
the information-seeking behavior 
and political judgment of voters. 
They also (as do Leonie Huddy, 
Stanley Feldman, and Eric Cassese 
in their chapter) attempt to draw a 
clearer distinction between affects of 
anxiety and anger (often lumped 
together as “negative emotion” in 
research into affective intelligence) 
and the differing responses they can 
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provoke. As Huddy, Feldman, and 
Cassese write in reference to their 
study of responses to war in Iraq, 
anger promotes a reduced percep-
tion of the risks of the war and 
support for military intervention, 
whereas anxiety largely heightens 
perceptions of risk and reduced sup-
port (228). Anger, as well as fear, is 
also a central concern for Ted Brader 
and Nicholas A. Valentino, who 
study the self-reported feelings of a 
group of white Americans toward 
increasing immigration and map 
them in relation to party identifi ca-
tion and other categories relating to 
“symbolic dispositions” (such as 
prejudices and group identity) and 
“material circumstances” (such as 
economic interests). Marion R. Just, 
Ann N. Crigler, and Todd L. Belt 
take up the study of a different affect 
that has also been underthematized 
in affective intelligence research—
hope—and use it to suggest that 
a more interactive (rather than du-
alistic) view of cognition and inter-
active is necessary (as do Michael L. 
Spezio and Ralph Adolphs earlier 
in the volume). Though none of 
these entries necessarily contradict 
the foundations of affective intelli-
gence theory, they do a stellar job 
of refi ning those contentions and 
identifying areas where more re-
search is needed and where sharper 
conceptions need to be drawn.
One of these areas is of course 
how affective intelligence might 
need to be thought of differently 
when considering the electorate or 
public as a whole rather than the 
specifi c responses of individuals or 
small groups being studied. The 
entries on macro models ably navi-
gate this diffi cult ground while also 
illustrating more attention to the 
particulars of how information and 
appeals are disseminated in public 
discourse. Doris Graber’s chapter 
uses monthly Pew surveys from 
1986 to 2003 to identify which news 
stories most profoundly captured 
the attention of the public. Although 
her conclusion—that stories about 
events resulting in massive loss of 
life or physical damage were the 
most affecting—is not necessarily 
surprising, it puts a fi ner point on 
arguments made elsewhere in the 
volume foregrounding the impor-
tance of fear and anxiety in the 
political tenor of the public, and 
Graber pays admirable attention to 
how particular components of me-
dia coverage (the use of sound, the 
technical quality of the footage, etc.), 
in addition to their subject matter, 
infl uence impact. Also of note is 
David C. Leege and Kenneth D. 
Wald’s chapter on the role of “cul-
tural identifi cation” in party strate-
gies and the importance of demo-
graphic targeting in campaigning. 
The authors commendably pay equal 
attention to “the way elites politicize 
appeals and the manner in which 
voters process these appeals” (294), 
and their study of the primary ex-
amples under review—the wooing 
of white evangelicals by Republicans 
and white business and professional 
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women by Democrats—is equally 
meticulous in charting how large 
swathes of the electorate have shifted 
priorities from their economic inter-
ests to their cultural “values” and 
identifi cations. While drawing sig-
nifi cantly on affective intelligence 
theory, Leege and Wald also suggest 
the need to extend that theory’s 
fi ndings to account not just for the 
defection of party partisans but 
also for the increasing importance 
campaign strategists place on “de-
mobilizing” or infl uencing the op-
posing party’s faithful to stay home 
on Election Day (315).
Multiple chapters in the volume 
wrestle with what I take to be one 
of the more striking or unsettling 
conclusions derived from research 
into physiological and affective 
functioning in relation to politics: 
the automatic or even “machinic” 
processes that drive the majority 
of political behavior. On the one 
hand, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion to this review, affect is often 
deployed, particularly in the hu-
manities, as a distinctive criterion to 
preserve human singularity against 
artifi cial information systems and 
processes. Similarly, as Marcus, 
Neuman, and MacKuen reveal in 
Affective Intelligence and Political
Judgment, their theory was largely 
anticipated and inspired by Herbert 
A. Simon’s 1967 article “Motivation-
al and Emotional Controls of Cog-
nition,” in which Simon intro-
duces his concern with the impact 
of emotion on human thinking in 
reference to debates over the dif-
ferences between human and me-
chanical “intelligence.”6 However, 
subsequent research of affect has 
somewhat paradoxically under-
scored the similarities between at 
least some major parts of human 
behavior and “mechanical” processing.
Take, for example, John A. Bargh 
and Tanya L. Chartrand’s “The 
Unbearable Automaticity of Being” 
(an article not included but multiply 
cited in Affect Effect), which argues 
that “most of daily life is driven 
by automatic, nonconscious mental 
processes” that develop from “the 
frequent and consistent pairing of 
internal responses with external 
events.”7 Among other research, the 
authors review a number of studies 
(by themselves and others) on the 
effects of stereotypes on behavior in 
support of their thesis. For instance, 
subjects “primed” with words relat-
ing to stereotypes of the elderly 
(“Florida,” “sentimental,” etc.) sub-
sequently behaved in line with the 
stereotype (walking slowly down 
hallways, having diffi culty with 
their short-term memory). In an-
other series of experiments, partici-
pants were subliminally presented 
with the faces of young African 
Americans; their subsequent be
havior was markedly more hostile 
(as opposed to the control groups in 
the experiments), presumably based 
on their conceptions of that group. 
Given this last example, some readers 
might take Bargh and Chartrand as 
being a tad blithe in their conclusion 
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that we should consider “automatic” 
affective processes as “mental but-
lers” acting “in our service and best 
interests” and who “know our pref-
erences . . . so well that they antici-
pate and take care of them for us, 
without having to be asked” (476).
Responses by authors of Affect 
Effect to the role of such “automatic-
ity” and affect as a whole in explicit 
relation to political behavior tend 
toward a mixed tone of concern 
and resignation. For instance, Dan 
Cassino and Milton Lodge, respond-
ing to the conclusion that the “evalu-
ation of social objects and, perhaps, 
of most of our mental experience is 
automatic,” write: “Affect may be 
more effi cient than other means of 
processing, and it may be the only 
avenue open for many citizens. It is 
also easily fooled, however, and 
can easily lead us to fool ourselves. 
Our mere likes and dislikes can 
tell us something about a political 
fi gure, but they become dangerous 
when they become reasons unto 
themselves. Moreover, the political 
appeals made to us are increasingly 
designed to appeal to affect, rather 
than reason, and, in so doing, may 
mislead us even more” (121).
These responses are appropriate, 
given limitations on attention and 
cognitive resources, but research on 
“automaticity” might also goad us to 
rethink the treatment of affective 
theory in the humanities, where, as 
Clare Hemmings argues, several in-
fl uential theorists—Hemmings’s 
primary targets here are Sedgwick 
and Massumi—tend to foreground 
what she calls “the optimism of 
affective freedom” while associating 
the negative aspects of affective pro-
cessing as part of “the pessimism 
of social determinism” that affect 
theory is supposed to free us from.8 
More specifi cally, a focus on the au-
tomatic or machinic nature of affec-
tive response might help us rethink 
concrete strategies for the strategic 
manipulation of affect for political 
purposes, a point I return to below.
The fi nal section of Affect Effect 
presents future directions for re-
search and outreach. Rose McDer-
mott contributes an entry on the 
need to more fully integrate neuro-
science research into our theories of 
the interaction between affect and 
cognition. Neuroscience can be a 
particularly rich resource for politi-
cal psychology, McDermott argues, 
because it provides clues to how we 
process and relate to our past affec-
tive experiences, and “the process of 
memory encoding and activation 
may be as important for understand-
ing relevant political processes as ac-
curately understanding the actual 
emotional experience” (397). A 
chapter by Arthur Lupia and Jesse 
O. Menning focuses on the potential 
for combining game theory and 
theories of affect. This combination 
may seem an unlikely one, as game 
theory traditionally takes rational 
choice as primary, a contention usu-
ally troubled in affect theory. How-
ever, the authors write, game theory 
often provides a fuller appreciation 
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of the importance of the emotional 
reactions of players than it is given 
credit for, and, I take it, given the 
continued popularity of largely 
computer model–driven game the-
oretic scholarship in mainstream 
political science research, the inte-
gration of affect theories into this 
fi eld has much potential.
Perhaps the most provocative 
entry in this category (as well as the 
volume as a whole) is a chapter on 
“The Affect Effect in the Very Real 
World of Political Campaigns” au-
thored by Dan Schnurr. In addition 
to being an academic researcher and 
teacher, Schnurr also practices what 
the editors term (in good humor) 
“the black art” of campaign consult-
ing (335). He writes that his two 
occupations have very different 
motivations—“a researcher wants 
to learn, and a practitioner wants to 
win”—as well as often dim views of 
each other’s members: consultants 
taking academics to be “ivory-tower 
idealists,” and academics just as 
likely to view consultants as “poorly 
educated vocational workers” (356). 
Schnurr very carefully and compel-
lingly relates the specifi c arguments 
made in previous chapters about the 
role of affect in politics to his own 
work in, and refl ections on, various 
campaigns. This comparison is of 
course a very useful and timely one, 
given the focus on affective appeals 
and the “authenticity” of candidates 
in U.S. elections over the past de-
cades. Indeed, as I write these words, 
pundits have come to the near 
unanimous conclusion that Hillary 
Clinton’s surprise win in the 2008 
New Hampshire primary race can be 
attributed to voters’ positive response 
to the “vulnerability” or sensitivity 
she displayed during a teary-eyed 
appearance at a campaign function 
a few days earlier. Earlier in the 
week Bob Wickers, a consultant for 
Mike Huckabee’s campaign, was 
quoted as claiming one of the major 
impacts of the wins by both Hucka-
bee and Barack Obama in the Iowa 
Caucus was how it showed voters 
“it was ‘okay’ to vote for the candi-
date they fi nd appealing,” regardless 
of the candidate’s relative lack of 
experience.9
Schnurr focuses, as do the major-
ity of contributors of Affect Effect, 
on the success of such emotional ap-
peals over more traditional evidence-
based strategies, but he leverages his 
consulting experience to also illus-
trate the importance of niche cam-
paigning and demographic target-
ing. His arguments, presented as 
a series of lessons ranging from 
“Candidate Biography Reinforces 
Message Credibility” to “Never Un-
derestimate a Clinton,” provide in-
sight into many specifi c strategies 
of recent campaigns, such as George 
W. Bush’s infamous “Mission Ac-
complished” appearance and John 
Kerry’s photo opportunity while 
obtaining a hunting license. Schnurr 
concludes by returning to his rela-
tively unique position among con-
tributors to the collection as both an 
active consultant and, he adds in the 
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interest of a “full disclosure,” a 
registered Republican. Urging his 
colleagues to “put aside their own 
concerns and prioritize the spread of 
knowledge over the achievements of 
their own political preferences” (374), 
he offers a fairly traditional position-
ing of such knowledge as capable of 
producing both “good” and “evil” 
effects. More interesting, though, 
may be an admission Schnurr makes 
just before this conclusion: “I have 
reconciled myself with the idea that 
Democratic students in my classes 
will probably apply the lessons I 
have taught toward the advance-
ment of political goals of which I am 
a dedicated opponent” (374). Many 
affect theorists in the humanities 
with progressive political goals have 
underscored the greater acumen of 
political conservatives in affective 
political strategizing. For instance, 
Massumi ends “The Autonomy of 
Affect” by mentioning that in North 
America members of “the far right” 
rather than the “established left” have 
been more attuned to the political 
potential of affect (105–06); Lauren 
Berlant has somewhat gloomily 
argued that one of the lessons of 
Kerry’s failed presidential bid is 
the diffi culty of translating Bush’s 
“shamelessness” about his record 
and decisions to leftist political strat-
egies that would seem to necessarily 
have to focus more on the ambiguity 
and complexity of political decision 
making.10 What’s often unspoken 
in such calls, even as it seems to 
be foregrounded in treatments of 
the affectivity and “automaticity” 
of contemporary politics, is that the 
appropriation of affectively attuned 
strategies from the right and for the 
left may require the adoption of prac-
tices often taken to be manipulative, 
deceitful, or contradictory to the val-
ues behind political objectives—that 
the call for “post-criticality” in pass-
ing beyond traditional concerns 
of how practices may “enforce” or 
“resist” the dominant order may 
require the sacrifi ce of a certain 
ethical clarity for us to move from 
descriptive accounts of affect to rhe-
torical strategies for manipulating 
these forces.
As a whole, Affect Effect, much 
as Affective Turn, provides an excel-
lent introduction to the contours of 
current thought on the role of affect 
and the affective processes of the 
body, one that often appears all the 
more elusive for having a material 
“location” in human physiology. 
Such a confi guration often makes 
affect appear both ubiquitous and 
comprehensively unaccountable, a 
replacement of the “invisible hand” 
of rational chance with the “invisi-
ble gland” of affective processes 
now driving political economy. Both 
of these volumes are excellent ex-
amples of the diffi culties of such 
accounting and have much to offer 
in regard to the possibilities for 
future work.
—Wayne State University
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